
In his book Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, Peter Hudis lays emphasis on the statement by Marx that ‘ it becomes clear that though private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labour, it is rather its consequence, just as the gods are originally not the cause but the effect of man’s intellectual confusion.’
He argues that private property is not the key to the emancipation of the working class but rather alienated – estranged – labour. He quotes Marx: ‘when one speaks of private property, one thinks of dealing with something external to man’ but Hudis goes on to point out that ‘Property is, after all, the product of human activity. Classical-political economy reverses matters, by presenting the predicate – property-relations – as the determining factor while ignoring the alienated nature of the workers’ activity.’ (p62)
For Hudis, this has implications for the centrality of the abolition of private property to those seeking this emancipation: ‘since private property is an objectified product of human activity, the critique of private property does not satisfy the requirement of reducing all emancipation to ‘relationships to man himself’. [quoting Marx] The critique of private property still deals with what is ‘external to man’. Marx’s normative principle of human emancipation – which he reiterates in 1844 as ‘man’s relation to himself only becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to the other man’ – drives him to look deeper than the property-relation. This takes him to his theory of alienated labour.’
As noted in the previous post, he quotes Marx ‘When one speaks of labour, one is directly dealing with man himself. This new formulation of the question already contains its solution.’ For Hudis, the solution is put this way:
‘It follows from the analysis that, while private property must be abolished – since it separates workers from the conditions of production – that alone does not get to the heart of the problem. The heart of the problem is abolishing capital itself, by ending the estrangement in the very activity of labouring. We have reached the conceptual pivot of what Marx sees as the alternative to capitalism.’ (p63). He later concludes that ‘In contrast to how Marx was understood by much of twentieth-century ‘Marxism’, our exploration indicates that his real object of critique was not the market or private property, but rather the social relations that underpin them.’ (p92)
Hudis continues: “Two points are worth noting from this. First, wages, like property, are results of human activity. They are made necessary by the existence of alienated labour. To ignore alienated labour while altering wage- and property- relations through the elimination of private capitalists does not undermine the necessity for a ruling class to impose forced labour on the workers. Society as a whole now becomes the ‘abstract capitalist’.” Hudis states this in referring to those socialists who think higher wages are socialist or that the existence of wages in itself is compatible with socialism, since ‘they are paid to the worker on the basis of the capitalist’s ownership of the products of labour.’ (p 64) Specifically, his reference to society becoming ‘the abstract capitalist’ refers to Marx’s view of this as a necessary concept arising from Proudhon when the latter conceives of the equality of wages.
In relation to ‘society’ becoming the ‘abstract capitalist’, Marx is quoted as saying that ‘‘above all we must avoid again postulating “society” as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being.” Hudis says that ‘Marx is not trying to wall humanity into the ‘social’; he rather seeks a mutual compatibility between individual and general interests. Yet exactly how does the present mode of production compel civil society to assume an abstract form? The answer is the social division of labour. By forcing individuals to adhere to a social division of labour, individuals become radically separated from one other. This separation takes on a fixed form, regardless of their actual talents and abilities. Society becomes an abstraction that governs the lives of individuals, instead of the other way around.’ Quoting Marx: ‘As long as man remains in naturally evolved society, that is, as long as the cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, so long, therefore, as activity is not voluntary, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him.’ (p 77 – 78)
How is this situation to be overcome? ‘By abolishing the social division of labour’, says Hudis, (p78). He makes the point that Marx ‘sees the process of revolutionary transformation not as a singular act, as the negation of private property and political overthrow of the bourgeoisie, necessary as that is, but as a consistently self-critical social revolution, that is, as a process of permanent revolution. Crude communism – the abolition of private property – is only the first negation. It is a necessary but insufficient step towards liberation. To achieve ‘positive humanism, beginning from itself’ much more is needed – the negation of the negation.’ (p73)
The end of alienated labour entails the end of the social division of labour but the overthrow of capitalism will not immediately end this division or the alienation arising from it. It will not immediately, or even rapidly, align individual interests with those of others or of ‘society’ as a whole: ‘History will lead to it; and this movement, which in theory we already know to be a self-transcending movement, will constitute in actual fact a very rough and protracted process.’ (Hudis, quoting Marx emphasis added, p 75). In this statement Marx is not talking about the end of the social division of labour but of abolishing ‘actual private property.’
The overthrow of capitalism and the beginnings of a new society will not instantly realise these aims; alienated labour will not immediately end. Private property relations of production entail alienation but alienation does not immediately disappear with them, so that alienated labour will still exist upon the overthrow of capitalist property relations. Capitalism is not therefore defined by alienated labour but by a particular form social relations that give rise to a specific form of alienated labour; it will still, ‘after the revolution’, be necessary to develop the forces of production, as Marx stated in The Communist Manifesto and still require that much labour remains necessary, understood in Marx’s terms as required to meet the needs of the working population and those dependent on them, while surplus labour, required to develop and meet new higher needs, including more time free of labour, will grow but not yet predominate. While this is the case the division of labour will entail alienation as will the continuing, although reducing, social inequalities.
A certain compulsion of labour remains, albeit more and more voluntary and collective as the forces of production develop to the degree that the time required for necessary labour declines and the choice over the extent of surplus labour increases. Just as the state withers away after the capitalist state is overthrown and a workers’ state created, so does estranged, alienated labour also shrink and fade. The continuation of a (worker’s) state and the continuation of alienated labour does not indicate the continued existence of capitalism, whether called ‘state capitalism’ or not, but the continuation of ‘a very rough and protracted process’, as Marx outlined.
Hudis quotes Marx saying that ‘man’s relation to himself only becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to the other man’ but it is through the relations of production that are entailed by bourgeois private property, and the society upon which is developed from it, that relations to other men and women and thus to him and herself are formed and within which alienated labour exists. The centrality of these relations of production and bourgeois private property entailed in them is repeatedly advanced by Marx and Engels in their political writings and programme as we shall note in the next post.
This, as we have noted, is also advanced by Hudis, that Marx’s ‘real object of critique was not the market or private property, but rather the social relations that underpin them.’
Back to part 59
Forward to part 61








