Tag Archives: gender

Marxism and Gender Ideology (3) – Nothing without our body

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In reaction to the Cass Report in Britain there has been widespread denunciation of the ‘toxic’ debate around the transgender issue without specifying why this is.  There has also apparently been wide agreement that there needs to be better data to find out the effects of treatment of children and young people.. 

The second link above shows that the apparent agreement is a fiction and that the supporters of gender ideology, within and outside the NHS, have both no need for data and no need for a debate.  The report itself reveals that most of the NHS’s gender identity development service (Gids) refused to cooperate with the inquiry in providing evidence and that this was ideologically driven, i.e. they accepted gender identity ideology.

It is abundantly clear that the toxic debate is not going away any time soon because the supporters of gender identity ideology have made it plain that there is no debate to be had, and that data on clinical outcomes of those young people who have had puberty blockers, or cross-sex hormones or other surgical intervention is impermissible.  This, however, is only one reason for the toxic ‘debate’.

As we saw in the previous post, the shifting, imprecise and downright misleading use of definitions means that you get routine claims about the ‘right to change gender’ when what is meant is the ‘right to change sex’ which does not exist because it cannot be done.

The issue is not therefore about a ‘right to change sex’ but the social and political rights to be acquired from claiming to have one’s ‘true’ sex recognised, which is to be established not by any sort of health care, such as hormonal treatment or surgical intervention, but by accepting the view that one knows one’s identity better than anyone else and being a woman, for example, is just such an identity.  Something that a man can be if he puts his mind to it.

This requires the belief that one can be ‘born in the wrong body’, meaning that the ‘real’ and essential person exists as something separate from the body, which is akin to the religious idea of a soul, also separate from the body. In this way the claims of gender identity ideology are a religion for which data, or any other scientific evidence, is irrelevant.  For this ideology, denial of the quasi-religious nature of its claims means that the pretence must be made to objective validity but this must then involve denial of the means of validation.  Irrational claims give rise to irrational discourse which gives rise to the toxicity.

The shifting, imprecise and downright misleading use of words, including the word ‘gender’ adds a twist to the non-debate by making it impossible to consistently identify what is being claimed or denied.

Gender can, as well as meaning sex, also be understood as the expression of social norms associated with and based on one’s sex, such as the characteristic stereotyped attributes of femininity to be expressed by women and of masculinity to be expressed by men.  We have looked at some problems with this is the previous post but let us park these for the sake of this discussion.

Effeminate expression by men, by some gay men for example , has historically been disapproved of in many countries, with patterns of socialisation generally working to impose those characteristics considered masculine that would prevent or negate such expression.  Similarly, the phenomenon of masculinised women, such as in some lesbians, has also been frowned upon.  Regardless of the advances in gay and lesbian rights in some counties, this socialisation process continues and is still considered ‘normal’ with deviations from it being ‘abnormal’.

In real life, no one fits the pure stereotyped norms of femininity and masculinity.  It therefore makes no sense to use the term gender in the way employed by one socialist: that trans means ‘people who wish to live permanently in the gender identity polar opposite to that ascribed to the biological sex’.   No one’s gender is the polar opposite of their sex, while the free expression of one’s personality is a part of what socialism is about.  Gender norms are restricting, stifling and enforce rigid stereotypes that are regressive for both sexes and for the relations between them.  

Everyone expresses some combination of the characteristics that may be said to make up the ‘polar opposites’ of the social expression of one’s sex.  To claim that one is a ‘polar opposite’ in identity to one’s sex is therefore to define oneself in stereotypical and reactionary terms, so that to assert political claims on such grounds is also reactionary.

Gender identity ideology might think it avoids this by positing the idea of numerous genders, so that ‘polar opposite’ is not the only alternative to female and male, woman and man.  This involves the creation of multiple genders, and different sources will provide different numbers of them.  If you Google ‘how many genders are there’ you might find that there are either 3 or 4 or 68 nor 72 or the number is undefined.  The BBC once claimed to children that there were over 100.

Since one’s gender is determined by one’s sense of oneself there can be any number of self-definitions, each of which must be considered to be valid by this ideology, precisely because it is self-determined.  But purely subjective identities are paraded because they crave social recognition, validation and acceptance, (otherwise they remain in a private domain without validation etc.) so the assertion of such identities is a political question.

This ideology thereby becomes the only political position that asserts its legitimacy and authority on the basis of an unchallengeable declaration demanding immediate acceptance. However, this ‘first-person authority’ championed by gender identity ideologists (trans people know themselves better than anyone else so we should all accept what they say) excludes those who disagree (for example women who deny that they have any sort of gender identity).

Whatever about such claims to novel ‘genders’, the majority are either male or female, and since women are most vulnerable to the consequent results, claims that men can become (or always ‘really’ have been) women are the most contentious.  Transmen in some male-only settings are at greater risk than the men they will encounter but this cannot be said for transwomen (men) entering women-only spaces.

This also means that while many transactivists supporting gender identity ideology think of themselves as left wing and progressive, their ideology is simply a mirror of the conservative and right-wing view of women that they claim to oppose.  While the most conservative view regards the proper expression of a woman’s sex as stereotypical femininity, trans activists often define what it is to be a woman through stereotypical expression.  The causal direction is simply reversed. For one, women should be feminine and for the other being feminine, in so far as they can make it, is to be a woman.  

Since ‘gender’ can be understood as sex, or as the expression of norms of socialisation of the sexes, we confront claims to be able to change sex, which is impossible, or claims to be able to change gender through having a sense of one’s sex being different from what it actually is. In the latter case gender is then conflated with sex.  Through identification with (or through) the social norms that are supposedly rejected the claim is made that one has changed sex.

The ‘explanation’ is to claim that to be a woman is to have some innate sense of being one.  This innate sense, in order not to be something contingent and open to challenge, is held to be common to everyone; everyone has a gender identity, whether admitted or not. We thus end up with the mantra that ‘transwomen are women’.  It is claimed by some supporters of gender identity ideology that everyone’s gender identity is expressed in terms of behaviour, appearance, including clothing, make-up, etc and is evidenced by it.

This ‘argument’ has its own problems. If a transwoman wears high heels, pretty pink dresses, lots of make-up and effects a flighty and skittish air they may be accused of believing that being a woman is existence as a crude stereotype that is insulting.  Not doing any of these things might leave the transwoman looking like a man and putting immediate and impossible-to-ignore obstacles to acceptance of their claims.  How recognition of all the other genders is to be accomplished, even by their bearers, is a moot point, including the idea of gender fluid, non-binary, non-gender, agender, third-gender etc.

More generally, what particular norms of behaviour, dress etc must be included in ‘gender identity’ and what is not, and how the mélange of social factors come together to instantiate and constitute a coherent sex status, is impossible to define.  A transwoman may seek acceptance as a woman, but fundamentally rejection or qualified non-acceptance will not be because of any presentation etc. but will be based on knowledge of the person’s sex; the real transphobe will be the one who rejects a transwomen fundamentally for their failure to represent masculinity.

What these point to are the limitations of subjective claims over objective reality, illustrated in other ways.   A person’s sex exists before it is ‘assigned’ (as the ideologists put it) and will exist whether it is ‘assigned’ at all, for example if no doctor is present ‘to do it’.  A baby girl and an old woman are still females; the first does not identify as anything and will, bar accidental factors such as death, develop into a woman, and the latter is still a woman whether she is, because of dementia, no longer able to be conscious of this fact or not.  When she is dead, she will be a dead woman.

It is claimed that because these subjective senses are unverifiable, we cannot test them – we cannot reach inside someone’s head to see how they really feel, process these feelings into thoughts and see how they are then formulated into claims to objective reality.  We cannot know the motivation behind a claim to a gender identity for example.  How do we know that a transwoman actually feels or thinks like a woman (leaving aside what this actually means) when they are a biological male?  In fact, the assertion would have to be to feel and think as a woman, although this lexical formulation is immediately less plausible.

How is it known that their ideas of their identity, arising (sometimes) as the result of psychological distress caused by various factors, conform to and constitute essential ‘womanhood’?  Since Gender identification is sometimes described by transgender activism as a political act, or that ‘there’s no one way to be transgender, and no one way for transgender people to look or feel about themselves’, or ‘there is no right or wrong way to be trans’, their claim is effectively denied.

Children come to know themselves through observing others and comparing themselves to others, including observing that there are two sexes and that they fit to one of them.  They learn that this cannot be changed.  In this, the sense of one’s sex is learned and not innate, even though it cannot be changed, so that for the vast majority of people it comes with the territory.  Distress caused by a perceived discrepancy between the idea of one’s sex, misnamed gender identity, and sex characteristics of one’s body can lead to what is termed gender dysphoria, but this does not allow one to change sex.  Even if medical and surgical interventions may help, that is relieve the distress to a greater or lesser degree, these will not change a person’s sex. They cannot therefore be a ‘cure’ for the claim that their condition requires a change of sex.

Such dysphoria evidences an awareness that one’s sex is different from one’s identity, from the claim to a fixed and innate identity as the opposite, or more accurately, other, sex.  Further, it is often asserted that this identity warrants the claim that despite natal sex, for example as a male, the transwoman was ‘always’ a woman.

In effect, the sexed body is rendered both relevant and irrelevant to the construction of all of humanity since trans people are still to be included under the classification of the two sexes that encompasses everyone. (We leave aside the many other ‘identities’ that render the whole ideology even more incoherent).  The claims about the meaning and importance of sex are therefore not just about trans people but about everyone and thus involve sweeping claims about the nature of the non-trans population that they are blissfully unaware of – that gender identity and not biological sex defines them and is definitive. Everyone is to be roped into the ideology whether they like it or not and the subjective claims of some become the objective claims on others.

In other words, if gender identity defines sex and everyone has a gender identity, everyone is defined by this phenomenon of gender identity with the social and political consequences demanded by the ideology.  ‘Transwomen are women’ can thus be read backwards.

If transwomen claim that they feel like women and have the same sense of themselves as a biological woman has, it implies that the feelings that biological women have, and their sense of themselves as a sex, is the same as that of transwomen.  I doubt very much whether the vast majority of women would endorse such a claim.  Not least because their understanding and feelings about being a woman are based on their female body, its functioning and the social experiences that this necessarily entails. None of these considerations involve ‘biological determinism’ in the sense that women’s social and political roles are biologically determined.

Many women therefore, as we have said, deny having any gender identity of the kind expressed by trans activism.  Their statements on their sense of themselves and the sexed bodies that they have will be more persuasive than the claims of men who do not inhabit female bodies, have not experienced life as a woman, and who cannot know how women feel about being a woman but can really only imagine or profess some idea of it.  

Women will do so with much stronger objective grounds to make such statements.  That they are often not called upon to do so makes it hard to avoid the view that a well-known hierarchy of authority between the sexes is being adopted.  In any case, regardless of any supposed authority, identifying as a woman does not make you one.

To sum up: you cannot change sex, you cannot become a different one by behaviour or appearance or other cultural attribute, and you cannot identify yourself into one.  Since we are most interested in the politics of gender identity ideology, we are left with the conclusion that any claims it makes are not based on reality.  For Marxism, if they are not, they are reactionary.

We will look at whether this conclusion can be explained further in the next post.

Back to part 2

Marxism and Gender Identity ideology (2) – What is it?

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If we look at the UK government’s 2018 consultation paper on reform of the Gender Recognition Act we see that gender is defined as ‘often expressed in terms of masculinity and femininity, gender refers to socially constructed characteristics, and is often assumed from the sex people are registered as at birth.’  Thus, do we immediately enter the world of indefinite definitions that create uncertainty as to their meaning and a tortuous journey to understand how it all is supposed to hang together in some coherent way.

In the document, a legally recognised gender is meant to allow replacement of a supposedly erroneous recording of sex on the birth certificate, although it cannot be the ‘right’ one because gender is not sex and is not defined as sex. The individual is entitled ‘to a new birth certificate issued with an updated sex marker’, and according to the definition of the Full Gender Recognition Certificate, this ‘shows that the holder has satisfied the criteria for legal recognition in their acquired gender.’  So, although it is a ‘sex marker’ it is not the actual sex of the individual, which is observed at birth.

Like so many other aspects of this question, as we shall see, sex is both central and to be displaced.

What it is displaced by is not clear, and certainly not by the above definition.  We are told that ‘gender’ is sometimes expressed in particular terms but not what it is that is being expressed.  This invites the question, what other expressions does it have that might lead us to understand what it is?  Perhaps this is explained by the definition of ‘Gender expression’, which is ‘a person’s outward expression of their gender. This may differ from their gender identity or it may reflect it.’  In which case the expression of gender that is supposed to be core to the definition of gender may not actually be a person’s ‘gender identity.’ 

The definition of gender goes on to say that ‘it refers to socially constructed characteristics’, which tells us that this is not a natural entity, like sex, which is biological, but is a social construction, but again does not tell us what it is that has been constructed.  What social constructions are we being referred to?  If it is ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’, why is this not stated, although it can’t be these because these are just some expressions of it and these, we have been told, may not reflect a person’s gender identity.  If conceived as social norms, of behaviour, presentation etc., it doesn’t make much sense to refer to individuals in terms of a social norm, which is a feature of society and not of individuals.

In any case, we are not told what ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ are.  These might be understood to refer to the characteristics of males and females, not to their natural attributes but to social ones that have been attached.  Could there be references to some notions of what ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ are or to concrete social practices?  Both, however, vary by time and place and are not like sex, from which we are told we might assume a person’s gender, which is immutable.  Gender, therefore, is something very different from sex, considered on even the most minimum basis, and gives rise to doubts as to how it could be a substitute for it.

Of course, these questions are easily answered if it asserted that ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ are often seen as expressions of one’s sex but not its substance and that socially constructed characteristics are often placed on the sexes, which is why we can often assume them from a person’s sex.  This however would not assist the project of replacing sex with gender.

The definition of Gender identity is ‘a person’s internal sense of their own gender. This does not have to be man or woman. It could be, for example, non-binary.’  So, if gender refers to socially constructed characteristics and gender identity is an internal sense of these, gender identity must derive from social characteristics that have been internalised.  If this is the case, gender identity cannot be innate and cannot exist at birth since at this stage of human development such characteristics as masculinity and femininity have not been perceived.  Since they vary by time and place, this also raises the question how something claimed to be innate, being inherent in the essential nature of someone, and from birth, can vary by time and place (unlike someone’s sex).

Nevertheless, this is the ground upon which the designation of one’s sex through a new ‘sex marker’ based on ‘gender’ is made, and of the political demands made by Gender Identity ideology. 

The uncertainty is increased when we are told that a gender can not just be either a man or a woman but ‘non-binary’, which is further defined as; ‘an umbrella term for a person who identifies as in some way outside of the man-woman gender binary. They may regard themselves as neither exclusively a man nor a woman, or as both, or take another approach to gender entirely. Different people may use different words to describe their individual gender identity, such as genderfluid, agender or genderqueer.’

What is meant by ‘identifies as’?  Is it a way of stating that a person is, for example, saying I am “neither a man nor a woman” or saying, “I am both a man and a woman’’?   If it is more or less the same as this, how does this make sense? 

How can gender identity, which refers to someone’s internal sense of their gender, which refers to socially constructed characteristics, refer to entities that do not exist, such as a person that is not a man or a woman?  Does this then mean that ‘socially constructed characteristics’ are, or can include, ideas or conceptions that have no material reality?  Are there any limits to the ideas constructed?  In what sense, and in what way, can someone saying they are, for example agender, be considered, and therefore treated, differently to someone claiming to be of the other sex (if these different genders are to be taken as socially significant)?

And what if the claim to be non-binary is really a political statement, in what way can the concept of gender and gender identity suppliant that of sex and its corporeal reality if such statements are also, or really, statements of political belief –  a political identity?

We are told that the Gender Recognition Act 2004: is’ an Act of Parliament that allows transgender people to gain legal recognition of their acquired gender, so long as that gender is a man or woman’, which lets us know that the law will not recognise something which does not exist, i.e. a person that is neither a man or a woman or a person that is both.  And we also don’t need to seek guidance on what the legal status is of the other genders.  This, however, leaves open the question what sort of thing ‘gender’ is, that can include things that cannot exist but is also something that can legally replace sex, which obviously does exist, for some purposes. 

We are not told what is meant by a ‘person’s internal sense of their own gender’.  What is meant by ‘sense’; is it feeling, belief, understanding, perception or knowledge?  Why should a person’s expression or statement of these be legislated as true, and subject to legal obligation by the state?  What other claims by a person of belief etc. are unequivocally accepted and acted upon by the state? Particularly when this ‘sense’ can also include things that do not make sense – like not being either a woman or a man or being both at the same time?

The definition of Gender Identity as a person’s internal sense of their own gender, is the basis of an ‘Acquired gender’, and ‘ The Gender Recognition Act 2004 describes this as the gender in which an applicant is living and seeking legal recognition. It is different from the sex recorded at birth and is instead, the gender the individual identifies with. It could be man or woman.’  Since both ‘gender’ and ‘gender identity’ do not require gender presentation or gender expression it is unclear how the ‘gender the individual identifies with’ could always be verified.  To identify ‘with’ something is not the same as identifying ‘as’ something (ignoring what exactly identifying as something can actually accomplish or entail).

In any case, what does it even mean to live ‘in’ a gender that is in some way different from your sex?  How can anyone live outside of or in some way different from what their body dictates, a body which is sexed and which determines so much of life and existence, even whether you are able to exist at all?  It is an elementary fact, understood by everyone, that life cannot exist outside the body because the functioning body is life.  To live ‘in’ some thing, and through this thing, is to live in a (sexed) body.

One does not live in femininity, for example, or in socially constructed characteristics, and social norms might be lived within society by a person but are not, as we have noted, a sort of internal identity.  Proof of having a collection of documents, such as driving licence, passport or utility bill, as set out in the Gender Recognition Act 2004, is a bureaucratic, simulated substitute. Those with a non-binary identity might struggle.

Other inconsistencies can be noted.  While gender and gender identity refer to social constructions and internal senses, ‘gender reassignment’ refers to ‘reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.’  Since sex can be replaced by a ‘sex marker’ that recognises a person’s ‘gender’, it would also appear that gender changes (or reassigns) a person’s sex by a physical process (that does not have to be completed).  Gender identity as an internal sense can replace sex while gender reassigned involves a physical process.  These involve two very different operations, and it is not explained in what way they are able to involve and accomplish the same task.

Finally, the British Government document states that it wants to know the implications of ‘recognising a gender that is neither male nor female’, which are, of course, the two sexes and I don’t know of any other.  At this point it is tempting to repeat philosopher Alex Byrnes’ remark in his book (Trouble with Gender, p107) that “what ‘gender’ is supposed to mean is anyone’s guess.”  The labyrinthine series of definitions examined above form the basic structure, such as it is, of an ideology that is supposed to sustain certain political claims, and it is this ideology that further occasional posts will examine

Back to part 1

Forward to part 3

Marxism and Gender Identity Ideology (1) – Introduction

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Last year during a break in the local anti-war meeting there was a short disagreement about the transgender issue.  The woman could barely conceal her disdain for the idea that men could claim to be women by wearing a dress and lipstick (as she put it).  The man thought that it was an important issue that had to be addressed.

The woman was primarily a Palestine solidarity activist but recognised the war in Ukraine as one in which hundreds of thousands of people were being killed and that had the potential to escalate with catastrophic results for the world.  The man thought the issue had important implications for women’s rights and should be taken up by socialists.

This brought to mind the passage in ‘What is to be Done’ by Lenin ‘that the Social-Democrat’s ideal should not be the trade union secretary, but the tribune of the people, who is able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects…’ 

So, the questions that naturally arise are about the demands that are raised by the trans activist movement and whether socialists should support them. We can start by looking at the Gender Identity ideology that grounds the politics of the movement and their ‘allies’.

Not all trans people support the same demands or Gender Identity ideology, and this ideology has various features and makes dissimilar claims.  What is hardly in dispute however, is that trans people should not be subject to unjustified discrimination or violence, and deserve respect based on our common humanity.  The specific claims of Gender Identity ideology are particular to a certain strain of trans political activism and make claims which go beyond this response.

In a series of articles in the British ‘Weekly Worker’ these issues are addressed, and in the fourth part the author writes–‘I use ‘trans people’ for the present purposes to mean people who wish to live permanently in the gender identity polar opposite to that ascribed to the biological sex in which they were born.’

At first reading this can be taken to mean that the issue is men, for example, who wish to live as women. Except, if this were the issue there would hardly be a dispute.  Few are going to object to men wearing women’s’ clothes, make-up etc. and presenting themselves as women, in so far as they are able, in their everyday lives.

Gender identity ideology asserts much more than this; it asserts, for example, that men are women if they consider – ‘identify’– as women.  As the mantra goes – ‘transwomen are women’.  This is stated, not as a metaphor, but as a literal truth.

This is the main problem with the definition as presented in the ‘Weekly Worker’; if we must assume that the word gender in ‘gender identity’ means something other than what it has (until this controversy) been traditionally regarded to mean – as simply another word for sex.  Instead, it is a word that is employed to substitute for sex and thereby erase it. In the next few occasional posts I will look at the ideology and the claims of the movement, beginning by asking what ‘gender’ and ‘gender identity’ mean.

Forward to part 2