Marx admires capitalism too much?

A worker gathers items for delivery from the warehouse floor at Amazon’s distribution centre in Phoenix, Arizona November 22, 2013. REUTERS/Ralph D. Freso

Marx’s alternative to capitalism explains that it arises from the contradictory nature of capitalism.  The simple and popular, but misleading, understanding of this is that it is primarily expressed in capitalist crises and class struggle, and although Marx had much to say about both, his alternative regarded these as arising from property relations, on which we based a large number of the previous posts in this series, and on his claim that communists put these to the fore in seeking social and political change.

We have noted the (one-sided) emphasis on resistance to capitalism – ‘anti-capitalism’ – and the impulse to state what you are against instead of what you are for, with what you are against being more concrete than what you are for.  Concrete issues and instances of exploitation and oppression are often denounced by abstract claims for justice within the existing capitalist system.

It is worth emphasising the contradictory character of capitalism because many of those claiming adherence to Marxism find it difficult to fully appreciate that, for all the horrors of capitalism, what in the end is most important is that it provides the grounds for socialism.  It is not a question of there being a good side to capitalism and a bad side such that they can be separated, except in the most superficial way of description, but that they are inseparable and that it is this integrity that involves contradiction and antagonism out of which a new society arises.

Even very informed views fail in this regard, so that there is a compulsion to emphasise the ‘bad’ while relegating the ‘good’ to some purely historical existence.  As we have explained in the previous post, in a reproduction and critical commentary on ‘The Communist Manifesto’, China Miéville records Samir Amin writing that it was a ‘hymn to the glory of capitalist modernity’, and repeats the words of Joseph Schumpeter that ‘Never, I repeat, and in particular by no modern defender of the bourgeois civilization, has anything like this been penned, never has a brief been composed on behalf of the business class from so profound and so wide a comprehension of what its achievement is and of what it means to humanity.’

Miéville complains that if this ‘is an exaggeration, it isn’t by much’.  The Manifesto ‘admires capitalism and bourgeois society and the bourgeoisie.  It admires them too much.’  He quotes ‘a phrase from Neary, in another context, The Communist Manifesto’s “negativity is not negative enough”. ‘It does not hate enough’, exclaims Miéville. (A Spectre Haunting: On the Communist Manifesto, p 176). We reviewed this request to ‘hate more’ in a general sense in the previous post.

This view not only does not consider the purpose of writing the Manifesto – for a particular organisation at a particular time – but also its status as the elaboration of a set of beliefs, principles and programme that has had lasting relevance.

In ‘The Communist Manifesto’, Marx writes that:

‘Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.’

‘For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeois and of its rule . . . The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property.’

‘The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.  But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons – the modern working class – the proletarians.’

So, Marx’s praise for ‘bourgeois civilisation’, ‘capitalist modernity’, and even perhaps his ‘admiration’, insufficiency of ‘negativity’ and ‘hate’ are not unrelated to the grand forces of production created by capitalism that are to be wielded by ‘the modern working class’.  

The ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ are not separate and attempts to keep the good ‘side’ of a phenomenon while discarding the bad are doomed to failure.  Worse than that, many of those that promise to do so reject the development and resolution of the contradictions contained in the phenomenon – this ‘civilisation’ and ‘modernity’ – with the assurance that it can be maintained either with ‘reforms’; by asserting that the bad can be removed, while refusing to supersede the phenomenon as a whole, or by the rapid instigation of planning as if this was the alternative to capitalism understood solely as a market phenomenon.

To see ‘bourgeois civilisation’ and ‘capitalist modernity’ as simply negative or to belittle their power is thus also to call into question the power of the weapons to be wielded by ‘the proletarians.’  Ultimately, to question the revolutionary consequences of the rule of the bourgeoisie is to question the revolutionary character of the working class and its future rule.

It is thus not enough to say that ‘It’s OK to be angry about capitalism’, in the words of Bernie Sanders.  Even in the citadel of world capitalism, in the United States, there is growing evidence of opposition to capitalism and sympathy with socialism, but it’s not enough to simply get angry or to hate.  Recent events have demonstrated that there is no shortage of both. It is necessary to understand and to do this requires appreciation of capitalism’s contradictions.

Karl Marx’s alternative to capitalism part 69

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Forward to part 70

The need to hate capitalism more

In the 1970s I used to sell the paper of the International Marxist Group Red Weekly every Saturday afternoon on Union Street in Glasgow at the side entrance of the Central Station. I remember one occasion when a visibly agitated man rushed up to me demanding to know whether I was a communist – ‘Are you a communist?’ ‘Are you a communist?’  He launched into a few remarks I barely took in at the time and don’t remember at all now.  I gathered that he was very angry about something and ‘communism’ was some sort of answer. He then exited as frantically as he had arrived.  I doubt very much he had anything to do with ‘communism’ thereafter.

I was reminded of this minor incident reading China Miéville’s book on Marx’s Communist Manifesto, in which he borrows a phrase employed by someone else, and in a different context, to say that The Communist Manifesto’s “negativity is not negative enough”. ‘It does not hate enough’, (A Spectre Haunting: On the Communist Manifesto, p 176)

This appears in a section entitled ‘On Hate’ in which he states that capitalism deserves to be hated, but that “a focus on hatred . . . is fraught, and dangerous territory . . . Hatred, after all, is an emotion that can short-circuit thought and analysis, can segue into violence, and not necessarily with any discrimination’; although he then notes that “hatred, particularly by the oppressed, is inevitable” (p170-171)

Against this he quotes Marx’s favourite maxim – Nihil humani a me alienum puto – nothing human is alien to me, and while he then states that it’s “hardly productive to pathologise hate per se, not least when it’s natural that it arises . . . the very absence of a critical mass of hatred may militate against resistance.”  He then quotes others on the need for ‘class hatred’ – “a radical structural hate for what the world has become” that is not “personal, psychological or pathological hate, but a structural hate.’  However, a hate that is neither personal nor psychological is not an emotion and a ‘structural hate’ must refer to something else entirely if it is to refer to anything at all.

Miéville is correct to refer to a statement about “deliberate hate as a rational category”.  The philosopher Martha Nussbaum noted that “emotions always involve thought of an object combined with thought of the object’s salience or importance; in that sense, they always involve appraisal or evaluation.”  The neurologist Antonio Damasio similarly comments that “Emotions provide a natural means for the brain and mind to evaluate the environment within and around the organism and respond accordingly and adaptively.”

This is the opposite of the view of emotions–that they cloud rationality, which they obviously can, and fits comfortably into the long tradition of Western philosophy focused on what is rational but which exaggerates both the disruptive potential of most emotions and the precision and certainty of human rationality.  Emotions are an evolutionary development of humanity that helps us quickly gather and process information about the world and respond to it accordingly.  

Some have made the comparison of thinking slow and fast, with emotions involving the latter entailing problems associated with ‘snap decisions’ and avoidance of ‘careful deliberation.’  If anyone was to look to Marx for inspiration, they might consider his long years in the British Library in London; his purported need to read all potentially relevant books on a subject before forming a definite view, and this resulting in missed deadlines and much unfinished work left to posterity.

Miéville believes that hate is not only necessary for resistance but “may help not only with strength but intellectual rigour, and of analysis, too” (p173). He quotes an Anglican priest, Steven Shakespeare, quoted above regarding hate’s “dangerous territory”, that it is necessary to be “more discriminatory about hate, where it comes from, where it should be directed, and how it gets captured for the purposes of others.’

So, we are into Goldilocks territory of not too much, and not too little, hate but just the right amount. Or we can appeal to Aristotle’s golden mean; where, for example, courage is a virtue but if taken to excess is recklessness and if too little, cowardice.  “Emotional intelligence” is a modern variation.  Cogitating on how much hate to evoke against capitalism is, however, a pretty unproductive pursuit.

Miéville, however, is particular about determining the need for greater hate, including that “Marx and Engels were too generous in their eulogy to its [capitalism’s] transformation and energetic properties, and to the bourgeoisie itself, as well as about the likelihood of its collapse.” (p175)

It might be more accurate to say that Marx and Engels were too sanguine, optimistic and confident about the overthrow of capitalism (not its collapse) but that they didn’t live to see the development of the workers’ movement or the programmes developed by its various parts that impacted on the outcome of subsequent failures.  The point of this series of posts is not to relay this long and involved history but to set out what their alternative to capitalism was, which should go some way to exposing the reasons for failure so far.

As for Marx and Engels being too generous about the transformational and energetic properties of capitalism, this is simply false; it is in fact one of their most brilliant judgements and predictions, fully confirmed by today’s capitalism and its spread across the globe.

Miéville says we should retain our “shock” at the iniquities that capitalism throws up and that provoke an “appropriate human response, the fury of solidarity, the loathing of such unnecessary suffering . . . We should feel hate beyond words.”  But the feeling of solidarity is also an emotion.  An emotion that we should wish to promote, which is not (simply) a “humane” one but one based on a feeling of class solidarity, to be combined with the emotions of pride in our cause and our movement, and growing confidence in our success.

If there is a deficiency in emotional investment it is in these, which are more vital to our future than learning to hate capitalism that bit more.  No one experiences only one emotion at a time (hence the falsity of the question repeated by Miéville “is your hate pure”); and as we have said, even the most instinctive emotion involves rationality and a degree of thought.

Marx noted, in relation to Miéville’s call that we should retain our “shock”, “fury” and “loathing” that some suffering has not been “unnecessary”, but absolutely necessary for the development not only of humanity in general but of capitalism and the grounds it creates for the subsequent potential for socialism.  Many still cannot get their head round this: that the suffering imposed by capitalism was unavoidable for its birth and development – and in this sense necessary – but that this does not in the least mean we do not cease to damn it and to seek its overthrow.

To claim otherwise – that much of the suffering endured through capitalism was unnecessary must explain a number of things.  How could capitalism birth and develop without suffering?  Is a non-suffering capitalism possible? Is socialism possible without capitalism (and therefore without this suffering but then also without the working class)?  Was all this suffering therefore without any historical meaning, but simply contingent and accidental?  Explain the laws of the development of capitalism and its relation to the possibility of socialism without contradiction and antagonism and therefore suffering!

Marx is criticised in Miéville for his greater criticism of other socialisms than of the bourgeoisie because the former has none of the “ambivalence” that he attaches to the latter. (p176) This “ambivalence”, however, was entirely appropriate in a period in which capitalism was more or less fully developed in only a couple of countries and had yet to supplant the legacies of feudalism.  Apart from recognition of the insights of the original utopian socialists, Marx admonished their succeeding followers because there was no merit in repeating anachronistic nostrums that were now reactionary.

Did Marx and Engels hate capitalism more than Weitling, Proudhon and Bakunin?  This would be a hard claim to sustain, but whose politics is the best guide to ending it, and would their’s have been better had they done so?

The emotion of hate has its (inevitable) place, but this does not mean “we must hate harder than did the Manifesto”; the demand for greater hate (“hate beyond words”) is a substitute for politics.  After all his detour on the need for hate, Miéville says that “Hate is not and cannot be the only or main drive to renewal.  That would be deeply dangerous.  We should neither celebrate nor trust our hate. But nor should we deny it.”  It would have been better had he started and elaborated on this than drop it into the end of a disquisition on how much we must hate more.

Karl Marx’s alternative to capitalism part 68

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