
Although this is how the decision of the supreme court has been interpreted, the actual decision is the narrower one of what the GB Equality Act (EA) of 2010 means by ‘sex’, which it has decided means biological and not certified sex. It has therefore been hailed by ‘gender critical’ activists as a victory for common sense and by certain trans activists as an attack on their human rights.
An alternative potential judgment – that the term ‘sex’ and thus sex itself – is determined by a certificate demonstrates how bizarre an alternative decision would have been. In effect, it would mean one’s sex as far as the state is concerned was determined through its award of a certificate. This would not have represented the continuation of the status quo, with the advances already achieved by the gender identity movement, but would have provided the grounds for a further attack on the rights of women, and then men. If sex was certified, what obstacle would exist to certification being required?
The judgement of the court dealt with the problem of pretending that there were two types of women with all the incoherence that this would involve. Anyone from the left lamenting the judgment, and state interference in matters that do not belong to it, should consider how we got to this position through gender recognition certificates and how the scope for its massive inflation would have been prepared by the alternative decision some seem to have wanted.
The court ruled that ‘Any other interpretation would render the EA 2010 incoherent and impracticable to operate’, and rejected ‘the suggestion . . . that the words can bear a variable meaning so that in the provisions relating to pregnancy and maternity the EA 2010 is referring to biological sex only, while elsewhere it refers to certificated sex as well.’ (para 265) In doing so the court rejected the deliberate ambiguity and confusion of trans arguments presented by the lawyers for the Scottish government in which use of the words ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ can alternatively be employed as synonyms and as different concepts as suited their purposes. I have looked at this sort of confusion before by what, for example, is meant by the word ‘gender’?
The court judgement stated that in getting a gender recognition certificate ‘there is nothing to suggest that undergoing such a process changes a person’s sex as a matter of law. It does not. Indeed, a full process of medical transition to the opposite gender without obtaining a GRC has no effect on the person’s sex as a matter of law.’ (para 200) It is also the case that this is true as a matter of fact, while the gender identity movement obviously thought the imprimatur of the law would allow them to claim this.
However, as the judgement stated: ‘a strong indicator that the words “sex”, “man” and “woman” in the EA 2010 have their biological meaning (and not a certificated sex meaning) is provided by sections 13(6), 17 and 18 (which relate to sex, pregnancy and maternity discrimination) and the related provisions. The protection afforded by these provisions is predicated on the fact of pregnancy or the fact of having given birth to a child and the taking of leave in consequence. Since as a matter of biology, only biological women can become pregnant, the protection is necessarily restricted to biological women.’ (para 177)
As the court notes ‘Put another way, if the acquisition of a certificate pursuant to section 9(1) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 applies to these words, so that biological women living as trans men (with a GRC in the male gender) are male, they would nonetheless be excluded from protection when pregnant notwithstanding a continued capacity to become pregnant . . .’ So, some women (identifying as men) would lose the rights that come with pregnancy were sex to be defined by the gender recognition certificate they might have.
The court ruled that ‘We can identify no good reason why the legislature should have intended that sex-based rights and protections under the EA 2010 should apply to these complex, heterogenous groupings, rather than to the distinct group of (biological) women and girls (or men and boys) with their shared biology leading to shared disadvantage and discrimination faced by them as a distinct group.’ (para 172) ‘Moreover, it makes no sense for conduct under the EA 2010 in relation to sex- based rights and protections to be regulated on a practical day-to-day basis by reference to categories that can only be ascertained by knowledge of who possesses a (confidential) certificate.’ (para 173).
Media reaction, and almost all previous media attention to the issue, has framed the judgement as one primarily impacting on trans women, much less on trans men (i.e. biological women), while some on the left that we have addressed before have repeatedly referred to the ‘small numbers’ (of trans people) involved, as if this meant that their feelings could be accommodated by any ‘solution’ regardless of any changed meaning to the word ‘women’, and thus the rights of half of humanity.
For all the faux left denunciations of a reactionary court by gender identity supporters, its recognition of the material reality of the sex class of women and of the shared ‘disadvantage, and discrimination faced by them as a distinct group’ shows it has a better grasp of reality and how to address it than some self-identified Marxists.
I am reminded of a tweet by the bête noir of the supporters of gender identity ideology, JK Rowling, who noted that she doubted Marx would have supported them:
‘Ironically, I can’t see Marx having any truck with gender ideology at all. He believed women were oppressed on the basis of their sex and I doubt he’d embrace a highly individualistic ideology that offers fertile new marketing opportunities for the capitalists of Big Pharma.’
The court seemed impressed by another argument that left supporters of gender identity ideology have failed to understand:
“Arguments concerning the definition of a protected characteristic are never simply manifestations of individual claims. They are always group orientated. The claim that one is a woman is a claim to be included within a particular category of persons and to be excluded from another. It is also a claim to include some persons and to exclude other persons within the group that one is a part of. This matters especially for aspects of the Equality Act 2010 which require duty-bearers to be cognisant of how their conduct might affect those who share a protected characteristic or where there is an obligation to account for the distinct needs and interests of those who share a particular characteristic.” (para 142)
This blog has repeatedly criticised the moralistic politics of much of the left, which has departed from class analysis based on an understanding of objective reality to moralistic claims divorced from this reality. So, their support for the supposed moral value of ‘inclusion’ means the inclusion of men in the category of women along with appropriation of their specific rights and prerogatives, regardless of women’s own views. In fact, if challenged some of these men claim that as women they are the best defenders of such rights!
All this is based on purportedly unverifiable subjective claims that this left makes no attempt to verify or validate. It thus accepts or acquiesces in all the most outlandish nonsense the radical trans movement throws out. The claim to the impossible – to be, or to be able to change to, the other sex – defies reality and thus rational debate but becomes an assertion that is to be accepted without question or to be asserted and imposed.
This is the significance of the compelled use of the ‘right’ pronouns on others and the ‘crime’ of ‘misgendering’, which can demonstrate acceptance of, if not agreement to, the tenets of this ideology. What is involved is not the exercise of rights but compulsion to unagreed social norms. In capitalist society the state stands over the boundaries and content of many social norms and this defeat for gender identity ideology not only sets duties and responsibilities on state institutions and private bodies but frees up restrictions on social intercourse that the gender identity movement has been so successful in imposing.
The court noted the argument of Sex Matters that ‘many organisations feel pressured into accepting de facto self-identification for the purposes of identifying whom to treat as a woman or girl when seeking to apply the group-based rights and protections of the EA 2010 in relation to the protected characteristic of sex. The result in some cases is that certain women-only groups, organisations, and charities have come under pressure (including from funders and commissioners) to include trans women and policy decisions have been taken simply to accept members or users of the opposite biological sex . . .’ (para 203)
Judge Lord Hodge from the court said the ruling should not be seen as a triumph of one side over the other, but it is.

